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Abstract  
 
Over the last five centuries, industrialised societies have experienced major 
technological innovation, mass production of equipment, expansion of energy 
infrastructures and networks and falling costs of fuels. This has meant cheaper 
heating, power, transport and lighting. This paper presents evidence on the decline in 
the cost of these energy services and the associated rise in energy service use, from 
the fourteenth century to the present day, in what was to become the United Kingdom. 
 
For most of the services (i.e. heat, power, transport and lighting), there was an upward 
trend in average energy prices during the second-half of the nineteenth century and 
much of the twentieth century. During the period, energy systems were dramatically 
altered with large scale substitution towards more expensive but higher ‘quality’ fuels. 
From the beginning of the nineteenth century on, though, the average efficiency for 
energy services always improves. This means that, since 1750, apart from a brief 
period of stagnation in the first half of the nineteenth for power and transport, Britain 
experienced consistently declining prices of energy services. We also found that, 
since the Industrial Revolution, demand for power, transport and to a less extent 
lighting appear to be inelastic. However, in the last fifty years, power and transport 
demand have become far more sensitive to declining prices and rising income levels. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Over the last five centuries, industrialised societies have experienced dramatic 
transformations. They have been freed from dependence on land and wood for 
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heating, humans and horses for power and transport, and sun and moonlight for 
illumination. Technological innovation, mass production of equipment, expansion of 
energy infrastructures and networks, falling costs of fuels, rising incomes and social 
and cultural change have revolutionised our desire and ability to heat, move and 
illuminate. Important economic and social welfare, resource and environmental 
consequences have resulted from these changes in energy services.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to present evidence on the decline in the cost of energy 
services and the associated rise in energy service use, from the fourteenth century to 
the present day, in what was to become the United Kingdom. An investigation into the 
economic and technological history of energy services identifies valuable lessons for 
our understanding of energy markets: by analysing the consumption, costs and quality 
of energy services, rather than energy; and it also helps us to understand how energy 
markets and market institutions are born, grow and decline, how innovations are 
developed and diffused, and how governments play their parts in service provision 
and market regulation.  
 
There have been previous long run indicators of the cost of fuel and light in the 
United Kingdom (including the detail in Phelps-Brown and Hopkins 1956, Feinstein 
1972, or Fouquet and Pearson 2003). However, these series do not take into account 
the efficiency with which energy consuming technologies use and convert the energy 
flows. Thus, they measure the price of energy, not the price of the energy service. 
William Nordhaus (1997) addressed this failure by estimating the efficiencies of 
lighting technologies, and then combining them with the price of the energy source, to 
create a ‘true’ price of light series for the U.S., which was dramatically different from 
the conventional light price index. Fouquet and Pearson (2006a) built on Nordhaus’s 
pioneering approach, created a much more detailed study of the technological changes 
and their impact on the price of lighting services, and focussed on the United 
Kingdom. It also extended Nordhaus’s paper by incorporating consumption data, and, 
therefore, identifying a relationship between the price of illumination, economic 
development and the consumption of lighting services. The current paper extends this 
analysis for a series of energy services: heat, power, transport and light.  
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There is also a wider context in which the evolution of energy service markets should 
be understood: climate change scenarios often draw on carbon dioxide emissions 
projections that are based on extrapolated trends in the relationship between fossil 
energy use, GDP growth, and fuel prices. But better insights about future fuel use and 
emissions might come from understanding the two-stage relationships between: (i) 
energy use, energy technologies and delivered energy services; (ii) and between 
energy service consumption, GDP growth and the costs and prices of energy services. 
As yet, however, both the impact of innovation on energy service provision and costs 
and the evolution of demand over waves of socio-technical development are poorly 
understood. Here, we aim to contribute to this understanding by investigating the 
separate trends in heat, power, transport and light in the United Kingdom. 
 
At the same time, as economists, we are not trying to provide a formal historical 
analysis of energy services. The richness and complexity of treatment that this would 
deserve is beyond our scope and skills (Church 1993, Hatcher 1993, Flinn 1984, 
Williams 1981, Hannah 1979, O’Dea 1956, Schivelbusch 1988, Smil 1993). This 
paper seeks to pull together a lot of exciting and disparate information in order to 
present the dramatic transformations that have occurred in the cost and provision of 
energy services over the last seven hundred years.   
 
In the next section, we briefly explain the market for energy services and the main 
energy systems that have existed over the last seven centuries. The following section 
points the reader towards the secondary and original sources for the data and briefly 
explains the methodology for estimating energy service costs and consumption. The 
subsequent sections present the data in the following sequence: the price of energy 
sources for heating, power, transport and light; the related energy technologies; the 
price of the four energy services; and the consumption of these energy services. The 
final section makes a few comments about the trends.  
 
II. The Market for Energy Services 
 
Economic activity involves transformations. Without energy - be it in the form of 
muscles, wind, water or solar power, or organic, fossil or nuclear fuels – these 
transformations could not happen. E.F. Schumacher (1979) said that “energy is for the 
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mechanical world, what consciousness is for the human world. If energy fails, 
everything fails.”  
 
The demand for energy results from the needs for energy services, such as heat, 
power, transport and light. To provide these services, it is necessary to combine 
energy with the appropriate equipment, be it a hammer with muscular strength, a 
harness with horse power, sails with the wind, or a train with steam, diesel or 
electricity. So, energy is an input into the production process for firms and households 
along with physical and human capital, labour, materials and land. 
 
Each market for energy services reflects the complex interactions of energy resources, 
technological development and institutions created to produce, trade and regulate 
energy. These interactions make-up the system within which demand and supply 
meet, prices are set, and energy is produced and consumed.  
 
In the last thousand years of history, there have been (broadly speaking) two main 
energy systems, the organic and the mineral energy systems, as Wrigley (1988) 
outlined. Each system had very different resource limitations, market structures and 
institutional structures. Yet, in both systems, the evolution of energy service 
consumption through time for a whole economy depended on (and interacted with) 
economic, social, demographic and technological activities and resource constraints. 
So, for example, increased economic activity in growing urban areas required 
additional quantities of energy services; the adoption of new technology, discoveries 
of new resources or depletion of old resources alter the means and costs of 
production. Long run adjustments to changes in output, income, prices, technology or 
climate can only be made gradually as qualitatively and quantitatively new appliance 
stocks are accumulated and used. 
 
We will try to present and discuss the broad trends in energy service prices and 
consumption over roughly the last seven hundred years. This presentation will enable 
us to explore and improve our understanding of the transition from a completely 
organic energy system to a full mineral-based economy.  
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III. Data 
 
Identifying trends in evolution of the cost and use of energy services requires 
statistical information on prices and consumption of heating, power, transport and 
lighting fuels, on energy technologies and their efficiencies, and on variables that help 
to explain service consumption patterns, including population and income. Details 
about the principal sources and methods used to assemble the data series associated 
with fuels, prices, consumption and technologies can be found in detail in Fouquet 
and Pearson (1998, 2003, 2006a, 2006b). 
 
It is worth, however, pointing-out the general sources of the data. There is a 
considerable amount of annual or periodic information on the history of energy 
services in Britain, collected from markets, schools, colleges, hospitals and 
government departments around the country, going back many centuries. Just to 
mention the most frequently used source, they are Rogers (1886), Beveridge (1926), 
and Mitchell (1988). However, despite their relative richness, it is necessary to stress 
that the data presented and discussed below should be interpreted with caution. 
Especially for the early centuries, the data are often drawn from the records of one or 
a few institutions that bought fuel for lighting in the South of England, and so are not 
representative of Britain as a whole. In some other cases, the data are interpolations 
based on information for previous and later years. In particular, while ‘annual’ data 
for ‘the United Kingdom’ are shown, there are considerable margins of error and data 
gaps, notably before the mid-nineteenth century. Hence, it is wiser to focus on the 
broader trends and the orders of magnitude differences over several decades or one 
technological revolution and the next, rather than on individual year-on-year changes.  
 
The conversion of the price and consumption of fuels into their equivalents in energy 
services requires combining them with energy efficiency of the equipment used for 
each service. For example, in the eighteenth century, a tonne of coal could be placed 
in a traditional fireplace and burnt, generating around ten percent of a tonne of coal in 
useful heat (Fouquet and Pearson 2006b). With this information, and the price of one 
tonne of coal (in 2000 money) being equal to £145, we can estimate the price of one 
tonne of coal equivalent of useful heat – about £1,450. Tables 1, 2 and 3, which will 
be discussed in more detail later, present the three variables (price of energy, 
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technological efficiency and the price of energy efficiency) involved in the 
calculation. It should be noted, however, that the calculation presented above for a 
coal-burning fireplace are not the same as those presented in Table 1, 2 and 3 for 1700 
heating. Many households did use coal in fireplaces (i.e. with chimneys); but, some 
households still burnt woodfuel in both traditional fireplaces and open hearths. Thus, 
the tables represent average estimates for the range of energy sources and 
technologies.   
 
Throughout the paper, prices are quoted in real terms (i.e. in £(2000) money). The 
retail price index is from Officer (2004). Thus, our costs of using different fuels and 
of producing services are broadly comparable across time.  
 
IV. The Price of Energy for Different Services 
 
Prices provide an indication of a fuel’s relative scarcity and value. There has been 
considerable debate about the expected trends in energy prices. In a sense, a non-
renewable resource might be expected to become scarcer as the stock is used-up. 
There has been a large literature on the study of long-term trends in non-renewable 
resource and energy prices. The evidence is inconclusive, yet there is little sign of 
growing scarcity (Krautkraemer 1998).  
 
Fouquet and Pearson (2003) also presented trends in individual fuel and average 
energy prices. A prominent feature of those trends was the dramatic declines in prices 
in the early expansion phase of the associated industries, such as the coal, gas, 
petroleum and electricity. The second phase tended to be associated with more 
gradually declining prices. In the third phase, where resources might begin to hit 
limits of availability and consumers might substitute away from these fuels (as in the 
case of woodfuels from the seventeenth century, coal from the nineteenth century, and 
petroleum from the end of the twentieth century), there was little evidence of 
systematic or substantial rises in prices.  
 
Another important observation was the absence of a clear rising trend in the weighted 
average ‘energy’ price series over five centuries. However, the second half of the 
nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century were characterised by 
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an increase in the real average ‘energy’ price. During the period, energy systems were 
dramatically altered with large scale substitution towards more expensive but higher 
‘quality’ fuels. It was reflected in the growing share of petroleum, gas and ultimately 
electricity in final user expenditure on energy over the period. So, a possible 
explanation for this price increase, rather than being associated with rising scarcity, 
reflected growing value consumers placed on the energy being consumed. 
 
Breaking-down the average energy price (and examining energy services later on) 
helps understand this argument. Table 1 presents average energy prices for the 
specific services over seven centuries.  
 
While the data hides considerable volatility, the evidence supports the arguments 
proposed above. Energy prices for heating and lighting fuels tended to drop before the 
sixteenth century, rise until the mid-eighteenth century, and fall with the beginning of 
the Industrial Revolution. For most of the services, there is an upward trend in 
average energy prices during the second-half of the nineteenth century and much of 
the twentieth century.  
 
Table 1. Long-Run Trends in the Price of Energy Sources, 1300-2000 
 1300 1500 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 
P(Heating 
Fuels)a 
150 140 145 160 70 50 90 160 90 
P(Power 
Fuels)b 
  3.4 3.4 11 37 68 52 100 
P(Transport 
Fuels)c 
    10 25 50 590 900 
P(Lighting 
Fuels)d 
38 26 38 40 25 20 6 10 4 
a - £(2000) per tonne of coal equivalent (for households); 1300 value is actually for 1441. 
b – £(2000) per tonne of oil equivalent; energy cost of wind and water assumed to be zero. 
c – £(2000) per tonne of oil equivalent (passenger); 1800 value is actually for 1837 horse fodder.  
d – p(2000)/kilowatt-hour 
 
There is a lot to discuss about the nature of individual trends, and this is not the place 
to go into much detail. We direct the reader towards Fouquet and Pearson (1998, 
2003, 2006b). Nevertheless, some brief points can be made.  
 
For instance, the price of heating fuels in households (which is represented in Table 1) 
rose from the sixteenth to the mid-eighteenth century. There was indeed a shift 
towards coal and away from woodfuels. Still, the rising price of woodfuels appears to 
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impose a rising average price – coal prices were relatively constant (in real terms) for 
those centuries. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, virtually all households 
have shifted towards coal. Then, from the end of the nineteenth century, the more 
valuable and expensive commodities enter the market for heating. First, gas is used in 
heating, then eventually electricity, to be dominated today by gas in central heating 
systems.  
 
The fuels for power and transport are quite similar until the twentieth century. 
Humans and mostly animals provided power until the steam engine arrived. 
Consequently, horse fodder (e.g. oats, maize and hay) was the price of fuelling power 
before the nineteenth century. For stationary sources, wind and water also generated 
considerable power – here, the price of these energy sources is assumed to be zero.  
Then, coal began to provide the heat that powered the steam. Coal was relatively 
expensive compared with horse fodder and free wind and water. The rising average 
price of power and transport in the nineteenth century is represented by the growing 
share coal takes. The introduction of electricity for stationary power also used coal for 
generating the power. At the end of the twentieth century, more expensive and 
effective natural gas begins to be used, alongside coal, driving-up the average price of 
power fuels. For transport, the growing use of coal in trains from the mid-nineteenth 
century increases the average price. Then, the share of the more expensive petroleum 
products for buses and cars increases; by the end of the twentieth century, they 
dominate the market for transport and, therefore, reflect the dramatically higher 
average price of transport fuels.   
 
Before the nineteenth century, most illumination results from fires and tallow candles 
from animal fat. It fluctuated through the centuries, rising somewhat in the mid-
nineteenth century. Animal fat (per unit of energy) was an expensive source of 
illumination. A hundred years later, gas was used widely and kerosene (or paraffin) 
was starting to light poorer homes. Although expensive in their first years of use, 
these new fuels soon became cheaper than fat. In the same way, the introduction of 
electricity drove-up the average price of lighting fuels, because it was initially very 
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expensive. By the end of the twentieth century, electricity had taken-over the whole 
market for lighting sources and its price had fallen considerably1.  
 
V. Improvements in Energy Technologies 
 
Table 2 presents the trends in energy technologies. As might be expected, through 
time, equipment uses the energy more efficiently. From the beginning of the 
nineteenth century on, the average efficiency for a particular service always improves.  
 
The improvement in the efficiency of heating in the last two hundred years is 
substantial – from 11% to almost 90%, when we moved from the simple coal-burning 
fireplace to the gas central-heating system. The early steam engines were quite poor, 
but they improved forty-fold in two hundred years after the beginning of the Industrial 
Revolution. For transport the improvements are far more dramatic. Though animal 
fodder was relatively cheap, a horse converts its oats into travelled distance in a very 
inefficient way. The steam engine was far more efficient, and the internal combustion 
engine more so. A two thousand-fold improvement in the efficiency in which prime 
movers used their energy was experienced in the last two hundred years. In those 
same two hundred, the shift from tallow to gas to electricity (especially with today’s 
compact fluorescent lighting) has enabled humanity to generate nearly one thousand 
times more light per unit of energy.  
 
Table 2. Long-Run Trends in the Energy Technologies, 1300-2000 
 1300 1500 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 
T(Heating)a 13% 13.5% 11.2% 11% 11% 13.5% 21% 41% 86% 
T(Power)b    0.5% 4.6% 10% 15% 20%  
T(Transport)c     10 24 36 11,700 20,000 
T(Lighting)d 19 22 27 29 36 190 500 11,600 25,000 
a - % of energy converted into heat  
b – % of thermal efficiency from Smil (2003) p.145. 
c – passenger-kilometre per tonne of oil equivalent 
d – lumen-hours per kilowatt-hour 
 
Innovations build on past experience and knowledge. Developments may direct 
changes in the technology in a way that leads to a less efficient use of energy. But, in 
                                                 
1
 In estimating the price of the fuels for different services, there might seem to be an inconsistency. For 
power, coal (and then natural gas) was considered the fuel for generating electricity; where as, for 
lighting, electricity is the energy source in the twentieth century. However, power is used for lighting, 
just like heating is used for power. Thus, coal is the fuel for power, and electricity the fuel for lighting.     
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the case of heat, power, transport and light, the cost of energy was a major part of the 
overall expenditure on the service. Consequently, efforts to reduce the cost of the 
service would lead towards reducing the amount of energy required to generate a unit 
of heat, power, transport or light.     
 
Possibly the most interesting case is when efficiency worsened. This is due to the shift 
from the open hearth to the fireplace. This appears to be a retrograde move, as the 
chimney, especially in its early years, was quite inefficient. It required more fuel to 
generate the same amount of heat. Yet, there are several clear reasons for the shift in 
technology. A crucial reason was that the chimney enabled the smoke associated with 
fuel combustion to leave the room or hall. Burning wood in an open hearth created a 
smoky room, with considerable health effects. This was undesirable. Using coal in an 
open hearth would have been a deeply unpleasant experience. Thus, when the 
chimney began to be adopted on a large scale in Britain from the sixteenth century, it 
was the only way to burn coal, which was a far cheaper fuel than wood (even 
considering the modest loss in efficiency for producing heat, discussed in section VI). 
The chimney also reflected a certain status in society and became fashionable then – it 
distinguished the middle classes from the labourers (Crowley 2004). Thus, the 
fireplace, though less efficient, provided additional attributes of value to the user: 
social status and externalising the costs of smoke.  
 
It is also probable that the conversion of energy was worsened when steam power (for 
stationary or moving purposes) replaced water power (for stationary power) and wind 
(for transportation). Reliability of service provision was improved – water and wind 
power were intermittent, where as steam could be created whenever a stoker had coal. 
There were, therefore, important characteristics of the technology that make it 
desirable. There have, therefore, been examples of worsening efficiency. But, they 
mostly done to improve the quality of service provided.  
 
V. The Price of Energy Services 
 
In terms of the service generated, the trends are quite clear. Before the Industrial 
Revolution, there are fluctuations in the prices of energy services. Once the scientific, 
engineering and marketing skills are allowed to flourish, the price of energy services 
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always falls (See Table 3). Thus, since 1750, apart from a brief period of stagnation in 
the first half of the nineteenth for power and transport, Britain experienced 
consistently declining prices of energy services.  
 
In those last two hundred and fifty years, the cost of generating useful heat has fallen 
more than 10-fold. To generate a unit of power costs 50 time less. To travel one 
kilometre is 150 times cheaper. To produce the same quantity of light, it costs us 
8,000 times less.   
 
Table 3. Long-Run Trends in the Price of Energy Services, 1300-2000 
 1300 1500 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 
P(Heat)a 1,250 1,000 1,250 1,400 700 500 460 380 130 
P(Power)b    140 35 35 20 4 2.5 
P(Transport)c   20 15 5 1 0.38 0.16 0.10 
P(Lighting)d 19,875 11,140 13,050 13,690 6,630 1,175 276 10 1.7 
a - £(2000) per tonne of coal equivalent of effective heat 
b – p/kilowatt-hour 
c – p per passenger-kilometre  
d – £/million of lumen-hour 
 
Throughout history, the price of energy services has rarely risen. In the case of 
heating, it did before the full switch to coal and the diffusion of the more efficient 
Rumford fireplace. Families still using woodfuels experienced substantial price rises; 
some of them were burning the wood in highly inefficient old chimneys.  
 
Another interesting example is the rise in the price of transport services during the 
seventeenth century. The evidence is based on the series for freight transport, which 
stretches back to thirteenth century, rather than passenger transport presented in Table 
3, which only goes back to the mid-seventeenth century. The explanation for the 
dramatic price rise appears to be associated with the growing use of roads of 
worsening quality. Transport services depend on a network of roads. The church was 
responsible for looking after the roads, before its dissolution under King Henry VIII. 
For a long period, there was no clear body responsible for maintaining roads, and they 
were left to local communities. It appears that they failed to provide an adequate 
service. The introduction of turnpikes in the seventeenth century was a reflection of 
the desperate need for institutions to provide these public goods – in this case, in 
private hands. Once turnpikes became widespread in the eighteenth century, the price 
of transport services improved substantially (Jackman 1960).  
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Another example of rising prices was for lighting in the eighteenth century. In 1696, 
lovers of natural light faced the introduction of the Window Tax. It was intended to 
reflect the wealth of the inhabitants, as proxied by the number of windows in the 
house, but inevitably, it “operat[ed] as a tax on light, and a cause of deformity in 
buildings” (Mill 1909 p.3.27). At the beginning of the eighteenth century, a tax on 
candles (and other articles of general consumption) was introduced to help fund the 
war of Spanish Succession. A duty of four pence per pound was placed on wax 
candles and one half penny on tallow candles, equivalent to a tax of about £1,000 for 
a million lumen-hours, or a 10% increase. This fed through into the (ten-year) average 
real price, which rose by nearly 50% between 1700 and the mid-1740s (Fouquet and 
Pearson 2006a).  
 
VI. Consumption of Energy Services 
 
The declining price of energy services will have led to an increase the consumption of 
energy services, both for reasons of substitution and of income effect.  
 
Again, focusing on the last two hundred and fifty years, consumption has risen 
dramatically. At present, estimates of the quantity of heating generated were not 
available. For power, use increased more than 200-fold. In terms of transport services, 
1,000 times more passenger-kilometres are travelled today than then. Finally, the 
increase in lighting is 150,000-fold.  
 
Table 4. Long-Run Trends in the Energy Service Use, 1300-2000 
 1300 1500 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 
Q(Heating)a         NA 
Q(Power)b 0.14 0.11 0.40 0.57 1 4 20 28 120 
Q(Transport)c   0.6 0.8 1.9 5 29 190 735 
Q(Lighting)d   0.005 0.008 0.05 0.35 11 250 1,270 
a – Not available 
b – Terawatt-hours of power 
c – billion passenger kilometres (i.e. only passenger transport); 1700 value is actually for 1715. 
d – trillion (i.e. one million-million) lumen-hours 
 
To compare these figures, it is first worth take account of the growth in population. 
Population has quadrupled, from roughly 15 to 60 million people. This means each 
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person uses 50 times more power, 250 more passenger kilometres and nearly 40,000 
more lighting than in 1750.  
 
Given the quality of the data, it is more appropriate to provide changes in orders of 
magnitude rather than marginal changes in behaviour. Thus, econometric analysis was 
not attempted on the data. Nevertheless, comparing changes in price, income and 
consumption provide some valuable information.   
 
We will compare the changes in consumption with changes that would result if 
demand was price and income elasticity was equal to one. Income rose by nearly 20-
fold in these two hundred and fifty years. If demand was price and income elastic, 
then per capita consumption would have risen: 
• For power: 1,000-fold (rather than the actual 50 times) 
• For transport: 3,000-fold (rather than the actual 250 times) 
• For lighting: 160,000-fold (rather than the actual 40,000 times).  
 
We cannot say whether it is more price or income elastic, but we can say that power is 
20 times less, transport is 12 times less, and lighting is 4 times less than unit elasticity. 
In other words, the demand for power is highly inelastic, transport inelastic and 
lighting moderately elastic.  
 
Just to repeat the exercise over the last 50 years, we can gather some evidence about 
the trend in elasticities. Population has only increased by twenty percent in that 
period, while income rose by nearly 4-fold. If demand was price and income elastic, 
then per capita consumption would have risen: 
• For power: 6-fold (rather than the actual 4 times) 
• For transport: 6-fold (rather than the actual 4 times) 
• For lighting: 24-fold (rather than the actual 5 times).  
 
Again, we can say little about price and income elastic individually, but it would 
appear that power is two-thirds less, transport is two-thirds less, and lighting is one-
fifth less than unit elasticity. In other words, the demand for power is highly inelastic, 
transport inelastic and lighting moderately elastic.  
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This suggests that in the last fifty years, the demand for power and transport services 
have become far more elastic, while lighting demand has become slightly less elastic. 
While it is not the place to provide explanations, we can speculate about the reasons.  
 
Perhaps lighting demand is starting to get saturated, while power and transport 
demand has found new ‘leases of live’. It might be to do with the nature of marketing 
techniques and success in convincing customers to generate more energy services. Or, 
it might be associated with other features of the services. The power and transport 
services have become privately-owned in the last fifty to one hundred years. The 
private ability to generate power and transport is an additional characteristic that 
places greater value on the service.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper was to present evidence on the decline in the price of 
energy services and the resulting increase in the consumption heat, power, transport 
and lighting, from the fourteenth century to the present day, in what was to become 
the United Kingdom.  
 
Despite the existence of considerable volatility in the original data series, the evidence 
presented shows that energy prices for heating and lighting fuels tended to drop 
before the sixteenth century, rise until the mid-eighteenth century, and fall with the 
beginning of the Industrial Revolution. For most of the services, however, there was 
an upward trend in average energy prices during the second-half of the nineteenth 
century and much of the twentieth century.  
 
During that period, energy systems were dramatically altered with large scale 
substitution towards more expensive but higher ‘quality’ fuels. From the beginning of 
the nineteenth century on, the average efficiency for energy services always improves. 
This means that, since 1750, apart from a brief period of stagnation in the first half of 
the nineteenth for power and transport, Britain experienced consistently declining 
prices of energy services. 
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In this paper, we do not seek to over-interpret the results. It is nevertheless worth 
drawing a few conclusions. The first lesson is that focussing exclusively on energy 
prices (as economists have tended to do, due to a lack of data) risks ignoring the 
actual processes at work in the market. For instance, deducing that rising energy 
prices are the result of increased scarcity might be correct, as in the case of some 
woodfuel in the eighteenth century, but it might also be misleading. At the end of the 
nineteenth and in the early twentieth century, higher prices reflected more valuable 
energy sources, using more efficient technologies, generating far greater energy 
services.  
 
Similarly, the second lesson is that focussing exclusively on the trends in efficiency of 
technologies (as engineers and historians of technology might do, again due to a lack 
of evidence) might ignore the nature of the fuels being used, their prices and the 
systems within which they operate. The rare declines in efficiency, as in the switch to 
the fireplace or the steam engine, reflect characteristics of the technology and fuels 
they use.  
 
So, looking at the services that consumers seek to produce tells a different story. As 
Nordhaus (1997) highlighted, the fall in the price of services is far greater than that 
indicated by the price of the fuel. The welfare improvements are far greater than 
expected.  
   
The paper also provides some indications about the response of consumers to the 
declining prices of energy services. Econometric analysis did not seem appropriate for 
data that is appropriate more providing orders of magnitude than marginal changes. 
Yet, a comparison of changes in prices and consumption can yield some information. 
We found that, since the Industrial Revolution, demand for power, transport and to a 
less extent lighting were inelastic. However, in the last fifty years, power and 
transport demand have become far more sensitive to declining prices and rising 
income levels.  
 
Returning to the second lesson, about characteristics of a good, it can be a reason for 
being careful to not to over-interpret the trends in the price of energy services, even if 
they do provide more information about the costs to consumers of generating the 
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services they are interested in. Market forces seek to find ways to heat or light homes 
or move cars in cheaper ways. Yet, sometimes, the consumer or society benefits from 
a way that causes less smoke or reduces the risk of burning the house down (as was 
the case with candles), or even indicates the social status of the owner. 
 
And, when considering future trends in the price of energy services, we might be 
aware that the for certain of these services - especially lighting, but increasingly the 
other services - the expenditure on energy is not so important. Other characteristics 
may be more crucial to what drives demand and the adoption of a new technology. 
Thus, trying to anticipate these future trends, analysts should consider what attributes 
are important for improving consumers’ value of the heating, power, transport or 
lighting experience.   
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